Maj Gen Tun Myat Naing, who now controls most of Rakhine State, discusses the chances for independence, how the Arakan Army (AA) is involved in Operation 1027 and his relationship with Beijing in this first part of the interview.
Aung Zaw: Mingalaba, Major General Tun Myat Naing. Welcome to The Irrawaddy! Thank you for this interview. I want to ask about the “Arakan dream” you have always mentioned. How is it going right now?
Tun Myint Naing: The Arakan dream is continuously advancing on its journey, despite numerous challenges. These challenges, in a way, validate our ongoing progress.
AZ: Can you give me details on how the Arakan dream is progressing? Where is it heading? What hopes do the Rakhine people have? What are their dreams? And how are you going to fulfill them?
TMN: The Arakan dream has two parts: revolution and reconstruction. After the revolution, we will build the Arakan nation as a dignified society with peace and justice; ensure equality among every person and harmonize with all societies.
We aim to be recognized the right person at the right place in world history.
It is a long journey. We have a long road map for that. But we are making good progress, and it’s all because of the unity and diligence of our people in this journey: the revolution.
This fundamental progress is what we refer to as that we are making good progress. We still have left many things to be done.
AZ: So observers in both domestic and international communities, especially in the global media and those who closely monitor Rakhine State affairs are talking and writing about whether Rakhine State will be liberated. What can you say?
TMN: If you ask whether Rakhine State will be liberated, it can be determined with time.
But we can evaluate it based on current conditions. We are fighting the battles fiercely in Rakhine State and we are on our way to winning. There are challenges in many areas. We had to retreat in some areas as the enemies defended themselves from their navy base and they received some support from their ally nation with drones and technology.
However, both sides have their secret techniques on the battlefield, and we will continue to conduct operations according to our plan.
In the meantime, we cannot evaluate the situation in Rakhine State only, but connect its circumstances with what is happening along its neighboring regions, the whole country, and include neighboring countries in [our strategy of] collaboration with everyone for ending [this crisis] and bringing success.
AZ: Regarding the discussion around Myanmar and its neighboring countries, I would like to discuss Operation 1027 phase two with you. To what extent is the AA involved in this operation and what are your expectations?
TMN: Our involvement may be on the battleground or carrying out our part to synchronize with the operations. We, the Brotherhood Alliance, used to fight together for the same battles sometimes. We later conduct operations separately in our areas.
Then we support each other by operating in each region as part of our grand strategy. It is how we operate harmonically among the Brotherhood Alliance wherever we are based. I can only talk about our military operation to this extent.
AZ: Yes. So if I may describe what you have said, there is coordination and a well-balanced movement among the Brotherhood Alliance.
We can say this, right? Some analysts and media have been saying that this operation is disjointed and that there is no coordination among them. They said the operation is not balanced. That is why I am asking you.
TMN: It’s not like that. We have different advantages and challenges in each of our regions. We have had different strengths and weaknesses since we started to ally and those differences are the reason we could associate with each other.
We help each other to support our weaknesses, and that is why we have been able to work together harmoniously until now. We may have some clashes with other organizations in some territories of the northern Shan State.
And we are trying to resolve and overcome the issue. It can be resolved.
AZ: Yes. We recently saw that the Northeast Command in Lashio had fallen. I want to know how you felt about it when you heard the news.
TMN: Instead of reminiscing about how I felt after hearing Lashio was seized, I would say there was immense satisfaction after the victory.
We already had a good plan and strong determination to win by launching a military operation on the target. There are more interesting things than this.
We thought it would be too difficult to fight them once again, we thought that they would have considerable preparations in technology and mobilized during the ceasefire period of Operation 1027.
When we launched an attack, we saw the morale of Myanmar’s military weaken. This is the most critical part and it is their most significant weak point. Instead of discussing my feelings, I think it secured success and brought hope among the people and other resistance forces.
AZ: So with the fighting in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has seized more territories in Gwa and Ann townships and Kyeintali town [in Gwa] during phase two of Operation 1027. As we saw battles in the northern Shan State and the fall of Lashio, we also are witnessing the AA’s victories in Rakhine State during the last six months. There are articles and discussions on whether Myanmar’s military would be driven out of Rakhine State by some media, some activists and other ethnic Rakhine activists. What would be your comments?
TMN: We might be able to expand our territories regarding the conditions on the battlefield. If we look carefully, we may expand our territory and drive the enemies away.
However, it is more critical for us to think about securing our success. The enemy may be unable to endure and flee from our attack.
They could come back with preparation at any time. Instead of acquiring some territories temporarily, we must continue to carry out military operations and engage in politics to secure our success.
AZ: What do you mean to engage politically?
TMN: There have been several attempts at political dialogue in Myanmar in the past. However, when we did not have military strength we did not get an answer from political dialogue.
We are now trying to solve problems on the battlefields, but we all have to find a resolution through political dialogue in the end. I think that the model of agreement we settle down at the end of the political dialogue can only guarantee.
AZ: China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently visited Myanmar. He went to Naypyidaw to meet Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. After that, news that China would put more pressure on the ethnic armed organizations came out. Can you tell us if the AA is also getting some pressure from China?
TMN: I do not want to say it is pressure candidly. They will enact policies that benefit them. We must also look forward to our nation’s and people’s interests without confronting other countries’ interests first. Being harmonious with them is the next step. We should not have confrontations to avoid conflict with other nations in carrying out the interests of our people.
AZ: Yes. Wang specifically told the junta to safeguard Chinese investment projects and its personnel in Myanmar during his trip to Naypyidaw. China has invested in the Kyaukphyu project and oil and gas pipelines in Rakhine State. What has China demanded regarding these projects? We have heard that some Chinese envoys recently went to inspect Kyaukphyu. Can you share your point of view on those investment projects?
TMN: Any country that invests in other nations would worry about the security of its projects and personnel.
It is an excellent strategy to know their needs and fulfill them as much as we can when dealing with them. If we don’t satisfy the needs of other countries, but our enemy does it instead, these countries will be on the same side as our enemy.
So we believe that protecting their assets, personnel and technicians in Rakhine State as security guarantors will enhance our dignity and our relationship with them.
In the past when Myanmar’s military controlled everything, there was neither transparency nor benefits: we didn’t have a chance to know which countries they had made agreements with, how much money they took into their pockets, how much land from the people they confiscated and how much the people have been paid in compensation from them.
People chose rejection instead of a reasonable response. The more rejections we make mindlessly, the more advantages the other parties will get. So we must observe and analyze carefully when responding to the issues and then lay down the policy.
We need to show them that we can do it for the people and let them know that they are not the ones people want so that conflict always occurs.
But we stand with our people and we can make that happen with their collaboration. It is what we can present to them.
AZ: I want to emphasize whether the AA and the Chinese government have a strategic negotiation and diplomatic protocol. Because the AA has gradually controlled the strategic points of territories and economic zones, that is why I repeat this question.
TMN: We will mainly consider the interests of our people and our country, as well as the benefits of our investment partner, fairness and environmental issues when we work with them.
Then we lay out the appropriate policy. In the earlier question, you asked whether we discussed with Chinese diplomats.
We are trying to engage and promote our interests as much as possible.
We do have strengths and weaknesses compared with the State Administrative Council [SAC].
The SAC’s strength is its bilateral relations with China as a state actor. So they used this leverage; they recently cried for help from China after Lashio fell.
We are not yet a state actor. How do I say it? We are a de-facto government that tries to break through and do as much as we can.
AZ: Yes, that is what I mainly asked. Thank you for answering that. While they have bilateral relations, on the other hand, on what level do the so-called de facto governments in territory held by armed groups talk about China or India as they have business projects and strategic investments? I think this is important.
Another question is that India has its Kaladan transport project in Rakhine State. How is that project going? Can you also let us know the relationship between AA and the Indian government?
TNM: After Operation 1027, the policies of Myanmar’s key neighbors: India, China and Thailand, in bilateral relations and border security become complicated. They have to accommodate how to deal with the change, such as the challenges that emerge on their borders and business interests with each party and the bilateral relations.
Some countries haven’t been able to manage this. I see China as the sole country that can handle that, among others.
China has a relationship with the armed groups in the north and still has a relationship with the head of the military as well. They can even oversee regional security so that they can respond actively compared with others.
For India, as they are a democratic government the way their bureaucratic mechanism works is slow. Even though their thinkers have ideas, their execution process is delayed by their politicians and decision-makers.
For example, the role of the security provider for borders in Myanmar has been changed, and they still haven’t made any adjustments to this change. When they are having an election, it is unlike any other country’s election. It takes several days. Its constitution has the central and federal governments.
Whenever they are not in line with each other, the delay happens. These are the advantages and disadvantages of our surroundings. Let’s look at other countries like Thailand and Vietnam, there are military relations between Thailand and Myanmar, the current condition of the Thai government, and the status of Myanmar and Thai citizens.
If we compare all of these factors, it shows their interests are incompatible. We have heard people’s excuses that if there is no military in Myanmar, regional security would be challenged. These are based on thinking for their interests.
AZ: I like your answer because they say Myanmar’s military is too big to fail. People see them as institutions that are hard to collapse. Neighboring countries see it the same way. You talked about Thailand and it is very interesting.
The role of border security providers has changed along the Thai border in Karenni, Kayah or Shan states.
Myanmar’s military has gone from all those borders. New and old actors are emerging.
That is why the Thai government and its army started considering having a secured border as a humanitarian corridor.
I want to ask about Bangladesh, which is adjacent to Rakhine State and has recently faced some political changes and a new administration has arrived.
How do these changes impact Rakhine State and your operations in the state?
TMN: Bangladesh has the least experience dealing with non-state actors in Myanmar compared to other neighboring countries.
Bangladesh has two neighboring countries, India and Myanmar.
The differences with Bangladesh are that Myanmar has a collection of well-established and militarily strong forces like the Karen National Union, Restoration Council of Shan State and United Wa State Army in the east and has relations with other neighboring countries; even if it’s not a bilateral type of relationship, there is proportionate recognition and collaboration in their association.
Bangladesh only had some experiences with some feeble revolutionary forces along its borders. Its border trade differs from Myanmar’s eastern border trade.
The amount of border trading is not much and they have few interests. It is not a valuable trade, even in good business years.
They may want to develop trade routes from Sittwe’s port to Bangladesh, which was built during the British colonial era.
However, since there is a conflict along its border with Myanmar, they can only prioritize border security and the refugees at the moment.
I have been learning who decides Bangladesh’s border relations and issues with Myanmar because we are going to have to deal with them.
So when it comes to making decisions, the Bangladesh military and its border security authority give the information and make decisions; they are more critical.
That is why we must contact them, not parliamentary representatives, politicians and government employees.
So we eventually deal with border security. They are also military personnel, so they always see things from a security perspective in whatever issue they have to handle.
They only think about problems such as refugees, security and repatriation. We have a wide variety of issues other than these problems regarding the relationship between the borders of two countries, such as trade and other regional matters.
Instead, they only focus on the border security and the refugee issue.
I understand that they have trouble receiving a lot of refugees and need to send them back.
Whenever we talk, they will recall the problem again and again. Myanmar is having a war at the moment, and is sending refugees back a good intention?
We asked them this question and had to explain the actual situation in Myanmar to them a lot.
However, we have heard that the new government of Bangladesh has said it will take a practical approach to this issue. It could be rhetoric from the politicians.
But we are waiting to see how they will bring about the issue. We are also preparing with a constructive intention to collaborate with them as much as possible.
The same goes for humanitarian aid. We have 600,000 displaced people in our territory.
We face more difficulties during the rainy season and the numbers increase. We also hope to get support through the borders of India and Bangladesh to help these people.
The new government of Bangladesh said it would help resolve this problem but we don’t know how fast or to what extent the help will come to us. It depends on their decision.
AZ: Thank you so much, Major General. You said that you have hope in the new Bangladesh government.
And you said you have 600,000 displaced people. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also outlined providing humanitarian aid in its five-point consensus. Besides, the United Nations has frequently been to Naypyidaw to discuss providing humanitarian assistance.
But in reality, how have the UN and other organizations been giving aid to the displaced people in Bangladesh and Rakhine State, including the 600,000 people you mention? Do they contact the AA for that?
TMN: It is a must-ask question, but I can only provide some proper answers.
According to the UN protocol, they signed an agreement with the government that they have to respect and precisely abide by the law of this country when they enter.
Because of this limitation, the UN and international NGOs must request permits whenever they need to travel. And if they want to send something, they must do it under the SAC’s supervision.
This formality doesn’t match what is needed on the ground. Myanmar’s military is using revolution and conflict as an excuse to collectively punish the people.
They are blocking the entire country, including the central dry zone of Myanmar, Kachin State and so on.
But they still get some access from borders. But in Rakhine State, they cut off everything, even the water routes. As the state is already poor, we are having more difficulties. We reached out to the UN and talked with their offices in Yangon and Naypyidaw.
They dared not go beyond their agreements to carry out the tasks. We also gave them some advice. We told them that if they only follow the formal rules, it won’t meet people’s needs.
They should think of a practical solution depending on the circumstances and find ways to deliver adequate support so that their help would be pragmatic and effective.
We also told them that we are ready to provide aid distribution fairly without discrimination, regardless of race or religion.
There are many religious and ethnic conflicts in Rakhine State and there is a lot of propaganda. However, do we avoid such conflict in our territory?
The religious and ethnic conflict is bursting into flame only in junta territory. We have been proven with our work for years. And we always say that we will collaborate with others for support and try to stabilize the region the more we gain control over it.
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